Post-War conceptions of human rights have evolved independently of long-established theory and practice of property and creditor rights, to the detriment of the development and implementation of human rights law. This chapter attempts to build a first bridge between these two fields of law. It begins by recalling the strikingly different origin and implementation of 'human' versus property and creditor rights, because the differences have significant implications. Human rights laws are more honoured in the breach than in the observance in most parts of the world, principally because states accepted international standards governing the treatment of their own nationals in their own territory while reserving to themselves the sovereign right to enforce those rights as they saw fit. In sharp contrast, when it comes to property and creditor rights, there are few gaps between principled intentions, legal mandates, and actual enforcement. Property and creditor rights are important for the attainment of other human rights, especially those of an economic nature, and many human rights are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly conceived property rights. There follows a discussion of the still wide gap between aspirational human rights and economic reality. The time has come for human rights scholars to ratchet down their expectations to match the very limited capacity of low-income and formerly communist countries most prone to human rights deficiencies to import the Western European welfare state model. The final section focuses on the poorly understood interconnections between sovereign debts and human rights. Neglect of property and creditor-rights considerations has led many contemporary human rights advocates down an infertile, if not inappropriate, intellectual and policy path. Speculation that contracts governing cross-border debts and investments may not be sufficiently compelling, at least relative to human rights commitments, is unwarranted and counterproductive.
Introduction*
The ample literature on human rights, including that focusing on economic rights, makes only occasional mention of long-established property and creditor rights. The omission may be rooted in the fact that most of the declarations and conventions on human rights issued in the last five decades gave unduly short shrift to private-property and creditor rights. Here, I begin by reflecting on the strikingly different origins of 'human' versus property and creditor rights, because the differences have implications. I subsequently highlight the importance of the enforcement of property and creditor rights for the attainment of other human rights, especially those of an economic nature. There follows a discussion of the wide gap between aspirational human rights and economic reality. Then, I shed light on the poorly understood interconnections between sovereign debt and human rights, because most writings on the topic fail to recognize the trade-offs and incompatibilities that arise because of existing property and creditor rights. Neglect of property and creditor-rights considerations has led many contemporary human rights advocates down an infertile intellectual and practical path.
Origins of human, property and creditor rights
The foremost human rights documents are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948, plus two associated treaties, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both approved in December 1966
and effective as of March 1976. Combined, the three documents are commonly known as the International Bill of Human Rights.
The UDHR contains thirty articles that refer largely to civil and political human rights, with articles 17, 23, 25, and arguably 26, enumerating fundamental rights of an economic nature, though they are often referred to as social rights.
1 Listed first is article 17, the right to own property, from which no one is to be arbitrarily deprived. In second place (article 23) are the schooling is to be made 'generally available and accessible to all' -and to become progressively free of charge.
These United Nations instruments spawned similar treaties at the world's regional levels: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an international treaty that entered into force in 1953; the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, 1978) ; the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR, 1981); and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Declaration (HRD, 2012). All of these treaties feature lists of similar civil, political, social and economic rights -and all of them recognize some rights to property, with the European and Inter-American system having developed the relatively broadest concept of property under human rights jurisprudence. 3 However, as in the case with the UN treaties, these regional undertakings include neither a free-standing right to private property -the right to acquire property is not specified -nor do they make any mention of creditor rights. Their protections against expropriation and regulatory takings are weak. The origin of the human rights movement that gave rise to these treaties, and to the greater public awareness -including within the legal profession -of the need to expand recognition and observance of civil, political, social and economic rights, has been the subject of debate. By far the most common starting point for modern histories of human rights is the post-World War II period. This is illustrated by the recollections of the late Louis Henkin, widely considered one of the most influential scholars of international law:
International human rights law… began with the Universal Declaration of Human even on the 18th-19th century 'international standard of justice' for foreign nationals. Rather, it derives wholly from contemporary national sources. 5 Some have argued that the history of international human rights can plausibly be pushed back by at least 100 years, because the Anglo-American campaign to end slavery (1833-65) and the international suffrage movement to secure the vote for women , foresaw the twentieth century approaches to civil and political rights. 6 The widespread adoption of treaties against the slave trade introduced the idea that violations of human rights were offenses of concern to humankind generally, and particularly in the United States, it was campaigners for abolition, who had mastered grassroots organizing, that became the chief promoters of women's legal rights.
Others have made the case that, on the contrary, it was not until the 1970s that a utopianism coalesced in the international human rights movement, such that had never existed before. 7 The year 1977, in particular, is believed to have marked a watershed in the international human rights movement, because that was when Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace Prize, and also when U.S. President Jimmy Carter invoked human rights as the guiding principle for his foreign policy. As has been pointed out, the words 'human rights' almost never were used in English prior to the 1940s, but in 1977 they appeared in the New York Times nearly five times as often as in any prior year in that newspaper's history.
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The short record of aspirational human rights jurisprudence and practice contrasts sharply with the rich history of organically developed property and creditor rights. Reliable generalizations about the earliest concept of property rights among hunter-gatherers are that it emerged as the unintended consequence of food collecting, ancient tool-and weapon-making, and the erection of temporary shelter. 9 The development of farming, in the millennia since 10,000 BC, expanded the concept of private ownership by encouraging individual families and tribes to claim control 5 Louis Henkin, 'Human Rights and State "Sovereignty" ' (1996) Sales on credit were a feature of less primitive societies, and thus there arose the possibility that one of the contracting parties would be late in performing. Public opinion provided two powerful sanctions in cases of late payment: one had religious roots; the other was a brutal form of the procedure of execution. Typical of the former was the practice of the creditor sitting himself at the debtor's entrance, there to remain until the obligation was fulfilled. 'The expected payment was seldom delayed, for public opinion would have punished instantly and severely the debtor who allowed his creditor to become exhausted or to die of starvation before his door'.
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The other means of compelling payment was seizing the debtor by force and coercing him to work until the obligation was settled -or seizing the debtor's relatives and selling them into bondage for the same purpose. The Law of the Twelve Tables, the legislation dating to 451 BC that stood at the foundation of Roman law, illustrates this latter sanction because it codified it.
According to Table III , if a debtor failed to fulfil his obligation, the creditor could arrest him.
And after having thrice publicly invited anyone, without success, to come forward and pay the A plausible explanation for the yawning gap between theory and practice is that the normatively strong human rights system has been largely ineffectual because of a major procedural defect.
States have accepted authoritative international standards governing the treatment of their own nationals in their own territory -but only because they reserved to themselves the exclusive, sovereign right to enforce those rights as they saw fit. 29 Despite the passage of time, it is evident that most states are very reluctant to tolerate national legislation or institutions that will restrict their freedom of manoeuver in relation to human rights-related policies -especially in countries most in need of respect for basic human rights. 30 Indeed, there is such aversion among states to countenance still more rights obligations that when an issue like human trafficking, say, is framed as a transnational crime, it receives much more state support than when put forth as a human rights issue.
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In sharp contrast, there are few gaps between principled intentions, legal mandates, and nutsand-bolts reality when it comes to property and creditor rights. These rights have been grafted through the ages into constitutions, laws, regulations and everyday procedures because, for the most part, they are homegrown, perceived as necessary, and widely accepted. The implementation of property rights, in particular, does not pose a challenge to sovereign authority, because states can always exercise their rights to eminent domain, especially for public use, appropriating for themselves personal and even intangible property -as long as they pay just compensation. While it is often hard to demonstrate the justiciability of violations in human rights before national courts, it is easy to do so when it comes to breaches of property or creditor rights since they are governed almost exclusively by domestic law, except when covered by international investment agreements.
Relationship between human, property and creditor rights
Most of the academic literature on human rights makes little mention of the importance of strong property and creditor rights. This may be because of the perception that the latter are associated with business interests rather than the needs of 'ordinary people,' but as will be made clear below, nothing could be further from the truth. It may also reflect the purist view that property and creditor rights are to be considered separately, if at all, because they govern the relationship between humans and objects, whereas human rights govern how humans treat fellow humans. 32 This is a narrow and unhelpful interpretation.
The result of these approaches is that by now these rights lack shared jurisprudential concerns, substantive connections, or even a common language. 33 In countries where the rule of law is well developed and reliably enforced, such separation between property and human rights need not be a major concern. In transition, post-conflict, and most other developing nations, however, where state power has been misused and the rule of law has been applied inadequately and unevenly, the disconnect is singularly unhelpful.
Billions of people around the world still lack secure property rights, hampering the attainment of their economic, political and social rights because land and housing are the most important assets of the poor. 34 Absence or insecurity of property rights is a central and ubiquitous cause of poverty, not only in the very poorest nations, but also in the largest middle-income countries such as Brazil, China, India and Russia. When property rights are not secure, economic transactions are hindered; efficient and sustainable resource use is unlikely; the evolution of effective credit markets is delayed; investment and entrepreneurial activities are discouraged; and thus the process of economic development has a hard time gaining traction. In many countries, land rights and security of tenure constitute the basis for access to food, livelihoods, housing and development for a large percentage of the population. Land is in many cases necessary also for the realization of other economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore, just and inclusive land rights have the potential to play a catalytic role in economic growth, development and poverty alleviation. Yet, land rights are still often viewed as part of the realization of other fundamental rights, such as the right to food or the right to water, rather than as a stand-alone human rights priority. Access, redistribution and guarantee of land rights are also crucial issues in post-conflict situations, especially in Africa and the Middle East. In those societies, property grievances need to be addressed in order to prevent new seeds of conflict being planted.
In recent years, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has adopted a number of statements highlighting the need to respect land rights, explicitly referring to them in relation to other areas such as housing, forced evictions, food, water, health and cultural life. Thus far, however, there is still no clear and comprehensive statement on the fundamental importance of the right to land.
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The urban poor, especially in Latin America, generally live in large shantytowns on the outskirts of major cities and are often migrants from the countryside in search of economic opportunities and personal security. However, that search is usually fruitless, because a pervasive feature of these squatter settlements is the vicious circle of illegality in which residents find themselves. Along with legal restrictions on women's mobility, employment outside the home, and administration of personal assets, those laws present barriers to women's economic opportunity. 37 Strong property rights protection is required to ensure that women can engage as productive agents of economic growth and avoid destitution in case of widowhood or divorce.
Women's rights in relation to land, including equality with respect to property rights, inheritance, and titling of land and homesteads need to be modernized. Evidence shows that where land is securely held by women they are better able to support themselves and improve their families'
access to health care, education, and means of survival.
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Still another priority to help advance the achievement of economic, political and social rights is to promote the creation of systems for collateralising moveable and intangible property -an example of how strong and effective creditor rights can help. Although many people in the developing world lack secure rights to use and transfer property, most own some tangible (moveable) or intangible property, such as intellectual property, brands or reputations. To the extent that this type of property is held securely and can be used to access credit and to create and grow businesses, the poor will have increased borrowing opportunities and investment capacity. Experience in a variety of developing countries shows that there are important legal reforms that if implemented will allow the poor to leverage their movable and intangible property.
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This brings us to a critique of the view that human rights are of a different nature than property and creditor rights, one that is prevalent in the human rights literature. 40 In this connection, the libertarian perspective is illuminating. It holds that property and human rights are inextricably linked, and not just because the former enable several of the latter, but also because, at their core, a number of human rights actually involve the assertion of property rights.
Human rights recognize each man's inalienable property right free of any coercive interference, and from this right to property follows the right to the services that one delivers. Each individual is the owner of himself, and thus the ruler of his own person; the human body is the first property of a human being. 41 A man's right to personal freedom, then, is his property right in himself. 42 Consequently, when the UDHR states in article 4 that 'no one shall be held in slavery or servitude …' it is repudiating a condition in which humans' right of self-ownership is disrespected, because a master is expropriating the services that a human renders.
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In like manner, other UDHR rights can be considered extensions of the libertarian principle that each individual is the owner and ruler of his own person. Thus, article 1 ('all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights …') follows logically from a recognition of each person's inalienable property right over his own being. So does article 2 ('everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind …'), because discrimination depreciates the property value of humans being discriminated against.
Article 3 ('everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person') is but a reaffirmation of the concept that humans with property rights are free to utilize their own persons as they see fit.
Article 5 ('no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment') likewise affirms the inalienable right to self-ownership. And so on and so forth with several other UDHR articles spelling out human rights rooted in the libertarian conception of property rights, which goes beyond the relationship between humans and objects.
There is, moreover, another sense in which a number of human rights are essentially property rights, a sense obfuscated in the extant literature. Take, for example, the human right to press and Internet freedom, covered under article 19 UDHR ('everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression … through any media …'). freely depends on how the state manages the distribution of newsprint, the licenses necessary to operate radio and television broadcast stations and any direct censorship of the airwaves and the Internet. If licenses to broadcast in a radio frequency spectrum are denied to political opponents, then the human right to a free media is compromised. If, on the other hand, radio broadcast permits are allocated by a non-governmental body through a transparent auction process, then the human right to a free media is much more likely to be respected. This illustrates how the human right to freedom of expression through any media outlet hinges on who owns the rights to newsprint, radio and TV broadcasting, and to uncensored Internet communications, and on how those rights are allocated. A human right like freedom of opinion and expression through any media, in this light, becomes essentially a property rights issue.
Consider also the human right to freedom of assembly, protected under article 20 UDHR ('everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly …'). This right will be exercised when a privately owned convention hall or stadium is rented by anyone who can afford it regardless of their political or other leanings. Once the property is thus reserved for occupancy, the right of peaceful assembly can be realized because people will be able to come together; they will be able to speak, listen and mingle; and they will be free to distribute or exchange printed or audio-visual materials. However, if said facilities were owned by the local or national government, or by private owners who can be pressured by state officials and if political or social dissidents were denied their right to rent the hall or stadium in question then the human right to peaceful assembly will have been thwarted. The human right of free assembly thus hinges on the property right to hire an assembly hall from its owners.
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In short, many human rights are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment…' Article 9 declares that: 'the states parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.' And in article 11 it states that the parties: 'recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions [and they] will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.' States are also obligated to take measures to ensure 'the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health' (article 12) and to provide educational services at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels free of charge in order to realize 'the right of everyone to education' (art. #13-14).
These economic rights are very expensive to deliver and difficult to adjudicate because of the large financial resources they demand. They entail substantial government initiative, administration and spending in multiple and complex areas -including ones in which many 47 Henkin (n 5) 34. 48 In fact, most poor-country governments cannot conceivably offer unemployment or retirement benefits, at least not to the vast majority of their people. Between half and three-quarters of their labour force operates in the underground economy -largely in agriculture, construction, smallscale manufacturing, and services -and thus workers neither pay the contributions necessary to cover the cost of such benefits nor can they properly document instances of employment for pay, on the one hand, and unemployment without pay, on the other. Indeed, informality is one of the important characteristics of labour markets around the world, with millions of (mostly small) enterprises and over a billion workers operating in the shadows. In more than half of reporting developing countries -from destitute Madagascar to relatively wealthy Uruguay -the share of informal employment in non-agricultural areas exceeds 50 percent, and in about onethird of countries it accounts for at least 67 percent of total non-farm jobs.
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Beyond the tight fiscal space that limited tax revenues generate, it is hard to imagine that many governments in developing countries, not least in Africa and the Middle East, could acquire the administrative capacity to deliver welfare-like benefits effectively, given the power struggles and rent-seeking activities that have consumed them. As it is, domestic factors and political arrangements have solidified non-egalitarian and corrupt institutions in many developing countries, such that the more privileged classes are traditionally the largest beneficiaries of any public social spending. Moreover, the welfare state as known in Europe is an alien concept in most low-income countries, where the role of governments in the delivery of services is typically far less important than that of informal family and tribal networks, who provide the bulk of income support and social services.
Even in middle-income developing countries, many of which have attempted to introduce elements of the European welfare state, results have not always been satisfactory or productive.
One reason is that economic development is a process whereby workers gradually shift from low-to high-productivity activities, and generally from agriculture into manufacturing and services, and where they benefit from the adoption of more capital-and technology-intensive production processes. The result is an increase in labour productivity, which is the basis for rising wages and salaries, and thus the increase of national incomes. In Mexico, for instance, social policy -the set of programs through which governments offer health services, housing loans, day care services, and various types of pensions to workers of any income level, type of employment, or labour status -has acted as a drag on that country's structural transformation process. The reason is that those well-intentioned interventions have slowed down the reduction of low-productivity agricultural employment and the increase in high-productivity jobs elsewhere in the economy. They have subsidized inefficient selfemployment and other forms of non-salaried employment, as well as illegal salaried employment.
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Therefore, they have interfered with the process by which workers seek jobs that are more productive and firms invest, grow, adopt new technologies, train workers, and take measures to increase their efficiency.
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In sum, the expectations of human rights advocates have not kept pace with the very limited capacity to institute a European welfare state, especially in the low-income countries most prone to human rights deficiencies. The common practice for scholars working on human rights and social policy in developing countries has been to advocate for larger shares of public spending on welfare. Little or no attention has been paid to the necessary revenues and administrative capacity, or to counterproductive impacts on economic incentives and this has led scholars down a barren path covered with Professor Dam's proverbial dead leaves.
The time has come for realistic, context-specific proposals that take account of cultural realities, political-economy issues, budgetary constraints, development imperatives, and imperfect institutions. The private sector, and not the public sector, will likely have to play a major role in the generation of jobs and the provision of health, insurance, educational and other services. In cases where a highly indebted state spends a significant portion of its budget on debt servicing, it stands to reason that less money will generally be available to progressively realise rights to things like health and education, and in many instances it will be hard for the state to satisfy core minimum obligations.
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Indeed, according to Sabine Michalowski, 'resources that are dedicated to debt repayment will not be available in order to improve the social rights situation in the country, and vice versa'.
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The trade-off between debt service and social spending is an oft-repeated assertion that has its origin in misleading anecdotal claims long made in Jubilee 2000 campaign materials -the coalition of religious organisations that has been advocating for debt forgiveness (cancellation) of the debts of the poorest countries since the early 1990s. 58 The claims have a faulty logic. To illustrate: during the 1980s, the twenty-nine countries (from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe) now considered the world's poorest made US$17¼ billion in debt-service payments on their longterm foreign debt, the equivalent of 2⅔ percent of their average annual GDP. 59 Yet, this does not mean that during the 1980s these countries had less money to 'progressively realise rights to things like health and education'.
The reason is that, during the 1980s, the twenty-nine countries also obtained US$42½ billion of new long-term foreign loans, the equivalent of 6¾ percent of their average annual GDP -such that they actually enjoyed a net of US$25¼ billion in additional long-term funds with which to 'progressively realise rights to things like health and education'. 60 To put it in perspective, the countries had on average an extra four percentage points of GDP -an economically meaningful amount -they could spend, each year, for whatever purposes the loans were intended. impacted negatively government investment outlays and current spending other than on salaries, which in fact tended to increase. 61 Since a large part of social expenditure involves salaries paid to government employees in education and health, this finding suggests that human-rightsrelated budgetary spending actually was more than shielded from the adverse effects of rising debt burdens -a conclusion consistent with prior research results on the resilience of this type of spending to austerity campaigns.
On the other hand, researchers looking at whether government spending on health and education relative to GDP were affected by changes in the ratio of total (external and domestic) public debt to GDP, found the opposite trend using a panel of up to fifty-seven developing countries for the period 1985-2003. 62 Following an increase in the stock of total debt relative to GDP, governments typically reacted prudently, by cutting spending growth and raising revenues by an amount beyond the increase in their interest bills, thus tightening somewhat the overall fiscal stance, and in the process, trimming new allocations to social spending.
The preoccupation with the potential fallout from rising debt and debt-service burdens that has easier-than-ever access to new financing, especially from the private international capital markets at exceedingly favourable interest rates.
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The key trends were the following. The same group of twenty-nine poorest countries, which had seen their combined total external indebtedness skyrocket from the equivalent of less than 50 percent of their GDP prior to 1982 to over 125 percent by 1994, registered a major cut in that ratio to under 30 percent of GDP during 2010-14. 64 In relation to total export earnings, the group's total external debt, which had jumped to over 600 percent by the mid-1990s from under the equivalent to two percent of GDP in the early 1980s, and had jumped to over three percent by the mid-1990s, shrunk to less than one percent of GDP in 2008-10.
Before the HIPC Initiative, the thirty-six countries (from Afghanistan to Zambia) that became eligible for debt forgiveness, including twenty-six of the twenty-nine world's poorest countries,
were spending on average slightly more on debt service than on health and education combined.
Since the mid-1990s, and as per the HIPC's requirement that governments allocate debt-service savings to social spending, they were ramped up markedly: their spending on health, education and other social services went up from less than six percent of GDP prior to 2000 to almost nine percent in recent years. 65 On average, such spending (nine percent of GDP) was about five times the current amount of debt-service payments (less than two percent).
Consequently, the question that should have been raised for research and intelligent discussion is whether the increase in social expenditures that transpired has indeed contributed to the enhanced realization of human rights in the most deprived parts of the world -yet, we are not aware of any quantitative studies or thoughtful reflection along these lines in the legal literature.
To be sure, recent, comprehensive reports on the state of human rights around the globe, produced by authorities like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, highlight few instances of advancements in human rights, and on the contrary they warn of retrogression in the many conflict-ridden and destitute countries in Africa and the Middle East. 66 But at least casual empiricism has prompted one human rights academic, Daniel Sharp, to acknowledge that while 'basic maths -comparing money spent on debt servicing with funds budgeted for public health programmes, for example -suggests that debt relief has great potential to help governments progressively realise economic and social rights, the reality is far more complicated'.
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Economists have been busy shedding light in their area of competence, which is the link between government expenditures and advances in health, education and other social objectives.
Interestingly, their research into the recent surge in social spending in low-income countries constitutes a powerful indictment of the approach that throwing more money -including debtservice savings -at health, educational and other problems is the appropriate way to progress.
As it turns out, the endemic inefficiency and corruption prevalent in low-income countries has rendered higher government spending largely ineffectual in the HIPC universe. For example, it has been estimated that governments in Africa could have boosted life expectancy by five years if they had followed best healthcare practices; by comparison, a ten percent increase in public health spending per capita has tended to yield an increase in life expectancy of a mere two months. 68 According to another study, improving the quality of governance in Sub-Saharan
Africa is imperative in order to improve health outcomes: the same increase in public spending on health has been twice as effective in reducing under-five years' mortality, as well as in increasing life expectancy at birth, in countries with good-quality relative to poor-quality governance. 69 Yet, a third research project concluded that a greater share of public health provision has not improved quality of life and life length itself. It found that reduction of inequalities in access to, and the provision of, health and educational services is a far more significant determinant of longer and healthier lives. achieving its stated objectives, e.g., improving policy performance and enhancing economic growth, investment, total government spending and tax collection. 74 Other contemporaneous studies also found that debt relief provided under the HIPC Initiative was having little impact on either investment or growth, probably because of the absence of the enabling institutions and business environment that provide the foundation for market economies. 75 Since that time additional economic studies have concluded that there is no clear evidence that debt forgiveness enabled higher investment or faster economic growth, except in the few countries with sound economic and political institutions, 76 or else under favourable economic circumstances, 77 and mainly in the absence of armed conflict. 78 Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle pure debt-relief effects from other benign and concurrent factors. The evidence suggests that many destitute countries cannot escape poverty traps even when they obtain debt forgiveness, because debt burdens were never the binding constraint: their weak institutions, incompetent administrations, distorted markets, weak property and creditor rights, and political instability constitute the undesirable foundations that usually keep them mired in poverty.
These hard facts and research findings, however, have largely been ignored by the human rights community, and thus they have not enlightened the understanding of the relationship between sovereign debt and human rights among human rights lawyers and activists. In some cases, notably the legal experts that have served the United Nations as independent experts on foreign debt issues, a denial of reality has led them to double down on fiction. According to Cephas
Lumina, who held the post of UN Independent Expert during 2008-2015:
Governments should not be placed in a situation where they are unable to ensure the realization of basic human rights because of excessive debt repayments. It may be contended that states' responsibility to ensure the enjoyment of basic human rights may take priority over their debt-service obligations, particularly when such payments further limit the ability of states to fulfil their human rights obligations. By the same token, whenever commercial disputes arise involving sovereigns and private-sector creditors, the overwhelming majority of the time they are negotiated rather than litigated. 82 The presentation of arguments involving human rights priorities, odious debts, economic necessity, The suggestion that property and creditor rights may be sacrificed at the altar of welfare spending is thus sheer folly, given the abundant evidence in the financial, economic and legal literature that respect for property and creditor rights is a fundamental prerequisite for the forward evolution and prosperity of nations. 87 Good investor protection, broadly defined as the contents and enforcement of regulations that protect investors in property and securities, combined with independent and reliable judicial and regulatory institutions, foster the development of financial markets, promote capital accumulation, encourage entrepreneurship and innovation, enable fruitful domestic and international trade, and thus boost economic growth and development.
As David Kinley has stated:
[T]he golden eggs of economic prosperity are essential ingredients in any plans or policies that seek better to protect and promote human rights, so to kill their progenitor or even to hinder significantly her fecundity would indeed be a serious problem. Uncompromising demands that the goose be neutered -that is, that the profit motive ought to be dispensed with, or the whole idea of trade liberalisation be abandoned, or aid be entirely decoupled from liberalist economic conditionality -are simplistic, counter-productive and today, thankfully, infrequently voiced arguments for better human rights observance. markets, it is difficult for governments to target a default in a way such as to prevent damage to human rights beyond those of the creditors. The case of Argentina is once again very instructive.
For many years after the fall of a brutal military dictatorship in 1983, the families of those abducted, tortured and killed ('disappeared' during a 'Dirty War') fought to get successor governments to admit responsibility and pay compensation, including for survivors. Amends were finally made starting a dozen years later, in the mid-1990s, when a first wave of political prisoners and families of the dead were given government bonds in compensation for their suffering.
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A few years later, in late 2001, a successor administration infamously defaulted on its obligations to bondholders, and caught in the net were the few thousand bonds given out in compensation for human rights abuses. Their owners petitioned to be exempted from losses of as much as 70
percent that the government sought to impose, but were told they could not be excluded because otherwise the legal principle that all creditors must be treated equally would be infringed, thereby exposing the government to a flood of lawsuits from the other jilted creditors. 90 They went on to pursue justice in the courts of Argentina, but despite support from a government ombudsman, they had no success. 91 Directly impacted by the 2001 default were also hundreds of thousands of retirees in Argentina and Italy, whose rights to social security were thus seriously affected.
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Conclusion
Post-War conceptions of human rights have evolved independently of long-established theory and practice of property and creditor rights, to the detriment of the development and implementation of human rights law.
The divergence in legal evolution of these two specialized areas owes much to the isolation in which they operate, and is part of a broader phenomenon of fragmentation in international law akin to the gulf that separates the concept of property as protected in human rights law versus in international investment law. 93 Notwithstanding evident similarities and important interconnections, there is hardly any interaction and cross-citation between human rights scholars, on the one hand, and property and creditor-rights scholars, on the other. Therefore, notions and ideas from one field of international law are virtually unknown in another, and legal problems and solutions common in one field are ignored by the other. Just as lamentable, whereas property and creditor-rights scholars are usually well versed in, or at least acquainted with, economic and financial concepts and their problem-solving applications, it is evident that human rights scholars are woefully unprepared in this regard.
The objective of this chapter was to build a first bridge between these two fields of law. It began by recalling the strikingly different origin and implementation of 'human' versus property and creditor rights, because the differences have significant implications. Human rights laws are more honoured in the breach than in the observance in most parts of the world, principally because states accepted international standards governing the treatment of their own nationals in their own territory while reserving to themselves the sovereign right to enforce those rights as they saw fit. In sharp contrast, when it comes to property and creditor rights, there are few gaps between principled intentions, legal mandates, and actual enforcement.
The importance of the recognition of property and creditor rights for the attainment of other human rights, especially those of an economic nature, was then highlighted. Many human rights are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly conceived property rights. At the very least, human rights advocates should admit that property and creditor rights are complementary to other human rights and cannot be neglected -especially when considering trampling over them.
There followed a discussion of the still wide gap between aspirational human rights and economic reality. The time has come for human rights scholars to ratchet down their expectations to match the very limited capacity of the low-income and formerly communist countries most prone to human rights deficiencies to import the Western European welfare state model. 
